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Comments and Casenotes
DEEDS OF TRUST AND ARTICLE 66, SECTION 24,
OF THE MARYLAND CODE
By HERBERT H. HUBBARD*
The law in Maryland by judicial decision, prior to the
enactment of this statute in 1892, was that when the owner
of the note or debt and the party in whose name the mort-
gage stood were different persons, the lien of the mortgage
followed the debt and the mortgagee of record had no title
or interest therein to convey or release; thus a bona fide
purchaser for value from the owner of the note or debt
obtained a lien on the property involved which was superior
to or attached to the interest of the bona fide purchaser for
value dealing with the property in reliance on the fact that
the mortgagee of record was the sole person interested in
the lien of the mortgage.' These cases involved technical
mortgages and not deeds of trust. However, several other
jurisdictions applied the same law to deeds of trust, often
basing their decisions on similar cases which had concerned
mortgages.'
In 1892, what is now Art. 66, Sec. 24 of the 1951 Code was
enacted. This section provides:
"The title to all promissory notes and other instru-
ments hereafter made, and debts hereafter contracted,
secured by mortgage or deeds in the nature of a mort-
gage, shall both before and after the maturity of such
notes, other instruments or debts, be conclusively pre-
sumed to be vested in the person, persons or body cor-
porate holding the record title to such mortgage or deed
in the nature of a mortgage; and if such mortgage or
deed in the nature of a mortgage is duly released of
record, the promissory notes, other instruments or
debts secured by such mortgage or deed in the nature
of a mortgage, shall both before and after the maturity
of such promissory notes, other instruments or debts,
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; LL.B., University of Maryland, 1950.
'Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 37 A. 266 (1897) ; Dickey v. Poco-
moke City Bank, 89 Md. 280, 295-7, 43 A. 33 (1899) ; Clark v. Levering, 1 Md.
Ch. 132 (1847) ; Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 2 Md. Ch. 20, 26 (1848) ; Boyd v.
Parker, 43 Md. 182, 199 (1875) ; McCracken v. German Fire Ins. Co., 43 Md.
471, 477 (1876) ; Hewell v. Coulbourn, 54 Md. 59, 63 (1880) ; see also, JONES
ox MORTGAGES (8th Ed., 1928), Secs. 1018-1021; 1033-1042.
a 59 C. J. S., Mortgages, See. 6, p. 32 and cases cited. See also 41 C. J.,
Mortgages, Secs. 8-15, pp. 282-5.
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be conclusively presumed to be paid so far as any lien
upon the property conveyed by said mortgage or deed
in the nature of a mortgage is concerned."'
The purpose of the statute was explained in Dickey v.
Pocomoke City Bank:
"The object of the Act was to avoid the complica-
tions that often arose by reason of the fact that the
release of mortgage by the mortgagee was not valid,
unless he also owned the evidences of debt secured by
it, and hence it often left the titles to the mortgaged
property involved, as the ownership of the evidences
of debt was not necessarily, or usually, a matter of
record."4
But what about deeds of trust in Maryland? Does the
statute include deeds of trust in the phrase "mortgage or
deeds in the nature of a mortgage"?
Of all the cases construing Art. 66, Sec. 24,1 the only
one which appears to answer the inquiry here is Royal
Insurance Company v. Drury,' in which the Court said:
".... in Maryland a mortgage debt passes only by assign-
ment of the mortgage itself, and does not pass by the trans-
fer of the mortgage notes.... but under a deed of trust,
such as we are here considering, the debt secured passes
by the transfer of the notes, . . ." The question before the
court, which was answered in the affirmative, was "whether
8 Emphasis supplied.
' Supra, n. 1, 296.8 See Flack's Annotated Code and Page, Latent Equities in Maryland, 1
Md. L. Rev. 1 (1936) ; Bank & Trust Co. v. College, 167 Md. 646, 653, 176 A.
276 (1935), is cited for the proposition that the statute "will probably not
be construed to give persons not assignees of the mortgage any rights".
Judge Parker in Sapero v. Neiswender, 23 F. 2d 403, 405 (4th Cir., 1928),
whose opinion is cited with approval by Bank & Trust Co. v. College, supra,
states: "It will be observed that in all of these cases the statute has been
construed as determining the ownership of the debt secured by mortgage
only as it affects conflicting claims with respect to rights under the mortgage
or in the property embraced therein." (Emphasis supplied.) See also Dickey
v. Pocomoke City Bank, supra, n. 1; Sapero v. Neiswender, supra, 405 con-
tinues: "In no case has it been held to have the effect of invalidating an
assignment between assignor and assignee, or as vesting the title to the
debt or notes secured by the mortgage in one who has assigned or trans-
ferred them as against the claims of his assignee." See Getz v. Johnson, 143
Md. 543, 548, 123 A. 74 (1923). Of. Whitelock v. Whitelock, 156 Md. 115,
122, 143 A. 712 (1928). Nussear v. Hazard, 148 Md. 345, 129 A. 506 (1925),
implied that Art. 66, Sec. 24, may destroy negotiability of a mortgage note.
Quaere as to the note which makes no reference on its face to the existence
of the mortgage.
8 150 Md. 211, 228-9, 132 A. 635 (1926).
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or not the final ratification of the sale of property made
under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust, to the
holders of the notes secured by the deed of trust, effects
'any change of ownership' in the property within the mean-
ing of the phrase as used in the 'standard mortgage clause',
now customarily used in fire insurance policies covering
mortgaged property." The facts of this case throw little or
no light upon the problem being discussed herein, since
this interpretation of Art. 66, Sec. 24, was made to resolve,
indirectly, a question of insurance law. In effect, this Court
apparently decided not only that the old Maryland doctrine
existing prior to the enactment of Art. 66, Sec. 24, as to
mortgages' also applied to deeds of trust but also that the
legislature had not abrogated this old rule as to deeds of
trust. This result is reached without citation of authority.
In other words, a deed of trust is enough like a mortgage to
apply to it the old Maryland rule of mortgage law without
hesitation or question and without the necessity of giving
reasons for so doing, yet a deed of trust is not a "mortgage
or deed in the nature of a mortgage" within Art. 66, Sec. 24.
The answer to this apparently anomalous situation is to be
found in the Maryland cases.
First there is the language used in many Maryland cases
in differentiating mortgages from deeds of trust. Many of
these cases were reviewed by the Maryland Court in 1924
in Kinsey v. Drury,8 where the court said:
"It has been definitely decided by this Court that a
deed of trust securing an indebtedness is not a mort-
gage within the meaning of various provisions of the
recording statutes. In Stanhope v. Dodge, 52 Md. 483,
it was held that a deed of trust to secure the payment
of promissory notes of the grantor might be recorded
after the expiration of six months from its date and
would then have the same validity as if recorded with-
in that period. The requirement of Section 32 of Article
21 of the Code that no mortgage shall be valid, except
as between the parties, without an affidavit by the
mortgagee as to the consideration, has been held appli-
cable only to technical mortgages and not to deeds of
trust. Shidy v. Cutter, 54 Md. 677; Snowden v. Pitcher,
45 Md. 265; Carson v. Phelps, 40 Md. 96; Stockett v.
Holliday, 9 Md. 499; Charles v. Clagett, 3 Md. 82; Stan-
7 See n. 1, supra.
8146 Md. 227, 230-2, 126 A. 125 (1924), decided two years before Royal
Insurance Co. v. Drury, supra, and related in some manner to the latter case.
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hope v. Dodge, supra. In Bank of Commerce v. Lana-
han, 45 Md. 396, where the provisions of Article 64
(now 66) of the Code relating to the exercise of powers
of sale in mortgages were held not to apply to deeds of
trust, the distinction between such instruments and
technical mortgages was stated by Judge Alvey as
follows: 'As to the question of the character of the deed,
upon careful examination of its provisions, we are of
opinion that it is not a technical mortgage, within the
contemplation of the Code, Art. 64, Sec. 5, referred to,
but a deed of trust, clearly denominated such by the
Code, Art. 24, Sec. 55. It is a deed of trust to secure
debts; and while it has some of the attributes of a mort-
gage, yet it presents features which distinguish it from
that class of security, strictly considered. By the legal,
formal mortgage, as distinguished from instruments
held to be mortgages by construction of courts of
equity, the property is conveyed or assigned by the
mortgagor to the mortgagee, in form like that of an
absolute legal conveyance, but subject to a proviso or
condition by which the conveyance is to become void,
or the estate is to be reconveyed, upon payment to the
mortgagee of the principal sum secured, with interest,
on a day certain; and upon non-performance of this
condition, the mortgagee's conditional estate becomes
absolute at law, and he may take possession thereof,
but it remains redeemable in equity during a certain
period under the rules imposed by courts of equity, or
by statute.' In reference to the deed of trust then under
consideration Judge Alvey said: 'Upon default of pay-
ment, these creditors, as mere cestuis que trust under
the deed, could not take possession of the estate and
apply the rents and profits to the discharge of their
claims; nor have they any right of foreclosure, such
as a mortgagee would have under a technical mortgage.
Charles v. Clagett, 3 Md. 94, 95. Their only remedy is
the enforcement of the trust; and, to execute the trust
requires the property to be sold.'
In view of the decisions to which we have referred,
and of the principle upon which they were based, we
have no difficulty in holding that the deed of trust in
this case, though not recorded until the expiration of
six and one-half months after its execution, was valid
and effective from that time as against . . ." (subse-
quent creditors).
1953]
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The earliest case above reviewed by the court is Charles
v. Clagett,9 in which the four judge Court split evenly thus
affirming the lower court.10 Speaking for the Court, Judge
Eccleston held that a deed of trust was not a technical
"mortgage" within the provisions of the statute requiring
an affidavit as to the bona fides of the consideration by the
mortgagee." He referred to a deed of trust as a "quasi or
equitable mortgage". Judge Mason, who dissented, called
the deed of trust under consideration "a deed in the nature
of a mortgage". He also said: "It must be conceded that but
for the interposition of the trustee in this case, there could
be no question as to the character of the deed. It would
clearly be a simple mortgage, and as such, within the
law.""' Thus, the earliest case had trouble in deciding that
a deed of trust was not a technical "mortgage".
In Kinsey v. Drury,2 supra, the Court held that deeds
of trust were not "deeds or conveyances by way of mort-
gages" and thus were not required to be recorded within
six months. 3 The quoted language of Art. 21, Sec. 24, is a
bit broader than just plain "mortgages", but the court rea-
soned from the decisions construing the narrower language
of other statutes. However, the earlier cases of Wilson v.
Russell, 4 and Bank v. Lanahan," had construed the even
broader language of the statute dealing with mortgages,
for future advances, which is most similar to the language
of Art. 66, Sec. 24, which is the subject of this discussion,
and which read, when Wilson v. Russell, was decided in
1859:
"That no mortgage, or deed of that nature,. . . shall
operate... as a lien or charge, on any estate or prop-
erty whatsoever, for any other or different principal
sum or sums of money than the principal sum or sums
that shall appear on the face of such mortgage, and be
specified and recited therein, and particularly men-
tioned and expressed to be secured thereby, at the time
of executing the same."16
93 Md. 82 (1852).
10 Although later following the case unanimously.
hArt. 24, Sec. 29 of the Code of 1860 (now Md. Code (1951), Art. 21,
Sec. 38).
Supra, n. 9, 95, 90, 87. Emphasis supplied. This footnote covers the
three short quotations immediately preceding it.
1Supra, n. 8.
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 21, Sec. 24.
" 13 Md. 494 (1859).
"45 Md. 396, 408 (1876).
21 Md. Laws 1825, Ch. 50; now Art. 66, Sec. 2 of the 1951 Code. Not only
Sec. 2 of Art. 66, but also Secs. 1, 3 and 25, use language similar to that
emphasized in these statutes dealing with mortgages for future advances.
[VOL. XIII
TITLE UNDER DEEDS OF TRUST
And which read, in 1876 when Bank v. Lanahan, was de-
cided, substantially the same:
"No mortgage, or deed in the nature of a mort-
gage.. .; this not to apply to mortgages to indemnify
the mortgagee against loss from being endorser or
security, . ..""
Other exceptions as to mortgages were added to the above
statute including, in April, 1924,18 the following:
nor are the provisions hereof intended to apply
to deeds of trust in the nature of mortgages or any
other deeds of trust to secure bonds, notes or other
obligations."' 9
Wilson v. Russell,20 held that the requirements of the
above quoted Act of 1825 were met by the deed of trust in-
volved and went on to say: "that deed is in the nature of a
mortgage ...,,;1 and ". . . it is in the nature of a mort-
gage ..,22 In Bank v. Lanahan,21 the Court was construing
a deed of trust to secure all of the grantor's creditors exist-
ing at the time of said deed's execution. The Court, in sup-
port of its decision that it was not a technical "mortgage"
and that therefore it was not necessary to advertise and
conduct a sale of the property under the deed in the county
where the property was situated, went on to say, after
quoting the language of the statute above:
"It is plain, therefore, that this deed would be seri-
ously imperiled by declaring it to be a mortgage, or
even a deed in the nature of a mortgage; as the amounts
1
'Md. Laws 1872, Ch. 213.
Md. Laws 1924, Ch. 224, See. 2.
19 Thus we see the precise terminology which probably should be used to
make it absolutely clear when mortgage type deeds of trust are intended to
be covered: "deeds of trust in the nature of mortgages". See: BoGEr,
TRUSTS AND TRusTTvs (1951), Vol. 1, Sec. 29, pp. 222-7; Diggs v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 112 Md. 50, 72, 75 A. 517 (1910) ; Weiprecht v. Gill, 63 A. 2d 311
(Md., 1948). It cannot be argued that the above express exception of deeds
of trust by the legislature means that deeds of trust are never intended to
be included when the phrase "mortgage or deed in the nature of a mortgage"
is used, since exceptions were also made of certain types of mortgages and
the same reasoning would not apply to the use of the word "mortgages".
However, it can be argued that when the legislature made this exception
of deeds of trust in Art. 66, See. 2, It failed to add said exceptions to the
Art. 66, Sec. 24, which also deals with mortgage type instruments and which
uses the exact same language.
Supra, n. 14.
Ibid, 528.
Ibid, 530.
U Supra, n. 15.
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of the debts intended to be secured, with one excep-
tion, are not made to appear on the face of the deed, nor
specified and recited therein. This is not required in a
deed of trust for the benefit of all the creditors of the
grantor, such as that in the present case.
The case of Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 495, relied on
by the counsel of the appellant, and where the instru-
ment in question was sometimes spoken of as a deed in
the nature of a mortgage, and sometimes as a deed of
trust, does not support the position of the appellant's
counsel in this case. There the deed was not a convey-
ance for the benefit of creditors generally, nor an
assignment of the property of the grantors for the pay-
ment of their existing debts; but it was intended to
secure two named parties the payment of an old debt,
and certain notes agreed to be loaned under the deed;
the amount thereof being specifically stated on the face
of the instrument. It was not pretended, in that case,
that the deed was a technical mortgage."24
Thus Bank v. Lanahan, expressly distinguished Wilson v.
Russell, and did not overrule it, holding, instead that a
deed of trust given to secure all existing creditors of the
grantor was not a deed in the nature of a mortgage.25 The
court probably felt it was more like a general assignment
to pay creditors which, unquestionably, is not in the nature
of a mortgage.26 However, the case was later cited as apply-
ing to deeds of trust generally,27 and, of course, the legisla-
ture so read the decisions, or else it had other reasons of its
own, for it added the aforementioned express exception of
deeds of trust.2"
-Ibid, 408-9.
The annotator to Flack's 1951 Code, under Art. 66, Sec. 2, writes: "This
section held to have no application to a deed of trust for benefit of creditors.
If such a deed were held to be a mortgage, this section would apply. Bank of
Commerce v. Lanahan, 45 Md. 408."
," BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1951), Vol. 2, Sec. 248, p. 804. See also
n. 18, supra.
17 Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra, n. 19, 72.
2 See Watkins, Maryland Mortgages for Future Advances, 4 Md. L. Rev.
111, 117 (1940), where the language of Wilson v. Russell, 8upra, ns. 14, 20,
is criticized and Bank v. Lanahan, supra, ns. 15, 23, as well as the cases
dealing only with the narrower language of other mortgage statutes are
cited in footnote 18 for the proposition: "That a deed of trust is not a mort-
gage within the provisions of Md. Code (1924), Art. 66, and Its predeces-
sors, has often been held. Esinger Mill, etc., Co. v. Dillon, 159 Md. 185, 190,
158 A. 267, 269-270 (1930) ; Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 230, 126 A. 125,
126 (1924) (recording statutes; Dudley v. Roberts, 144 Md. 155, 124 A. 883
(1923); Diggs v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 112 Md. 50, 72, 75 A. 517, 521
(1910); Bank of Commerce v. Lanahan, 45 Md. 396, 408-9 (1876)." That
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The result of the decisions in Maryland under various
such statutes was that the provisions of the Code relating
to the execution and recording of mortgages, were to be
construed as referring to deeds of mortgage, technically
such, and did not apply to deeds of trust. 9
The reason why the earlier Maryland Courts were loath
to hold that deeds of trust were within the purview of our
mortgage statutes is explained in Harrison v. A. & E. R.R.
Co. 30
"In several of the more recent decisions of this
court, in which the construction of different sections
of Art. 64, title Mortgage, of the Code of the Public
General Laws, was involved, it has been held that the
mortgages therein referred to were 'technical mort-
gages', and the court has distinguished other instru-
ments, which in some respects were equitable mort-
gages, from technical mortgages, to avoid the embar-
rassment and inconveniences which would result from
applying all the provisions annexed to technical mort-
gages to other deeds of a cognate character, deeds of
trust, etc. Charles v. Clagett, 3 Md. 82; Bank v. Lana-
han, 45 Md. 396."
In this case the objection had again been raised to a sale
of the premises under a deed of trust outside of the county
where the land lay but Bank v. Lanahan had already dealt
with this problem as explained earlier."1 Thus the early
Courts which are responsible for the construction placed on
the mortgage statutes did not wish to cause an innocent
person claiming in good faith and for value under a deed of
trust to suffer merely because he failed to comply with cer-
tain formal requirements; requirements which he could
have in good faith believed did not apply to deeds of trust
in the nature of mortgages and hence made no effort at
compliance therewith in executing or recording the instru-
ment. Even though these requirements were designed to
avoid or make less probable the occurrence of a real sub-
part of the text which cites the foregoing footnote reads: "If it were simply
a deed of trust, the provisions of the Act of 1825, and of (sic) the provisions
of Art. 66, even before the amendment of Sections 2 and 3 in 1924, would
have been inapplicable." This was said in reference to Wilson v. Russell.
In the conclusion doubt is expressed as to the reason for, or the propriety of,
excepting deeds of trust from the operation of Art. 66, Sec. 2.
2 Carson v. Phelps, 40 Md. 73, 90 (1874) ; Snowden v. Pitcher, 45 Md. 260
(1876) ; Harrison v. A. & E. R.R. Co., 50 Md. 490 (1879).
10 Supra, n. 29, 514, 515.
' Supra, n. 23.
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stantive evil, such evil evidently was not believed to have
actually occurred in the cases at bar. 2
In Wilson v. Russell, 3 the instrument was found in com-
pliance with the statute and so the Court had no hesitation
in treating it as if it were in fact governed by said statute.
In Bank v. Lanahan,3 4 the court was also very concerned
about upholding the public faith in public sales of property
generally.
Art. 66, Sec. 24, is not a statute in the nature of those
construed in any of the aforementioned cases but was
designed to overcome early judicial decisions which had
preferred the owner of the note or debt over the mortgage
recorded under the recording system. These decisions were
probably partly a result of the experience derived from
England and the early years of the United States where
no recording systems on the scale of those later developed
in the United States ever existed. 5 The statute's obvious
purpose was to reverse this state of the law and to prefer
the person relying upon the recording system in a case
where some security of record had been given for a note
or for just a debt. 6 Whether or not the instrument which
accomplishes this result happens to be labeled a deed of
trust or a mortgage should not be controlling in a case
where the problem is squarely before the court as to
whether the actual loss should fall upon the good faith note
or debt owner without notice 7 who relies on his ownership
of the note or debt, or upon the party who in good faith
and without notice has dealt with the property or the
security instrument of record in reliance on the record."8
For example, though an affidavit of consideration was required there
was no real dispute over the fact that bona fide consideration had passed.
See Charles v. Clagett, 3 Md. 82 (1852) ; no fraud was believed to have
occurred although the trust deed did not comply with Art. 66, Sec. 2. See
also Cole v. Albers, 1 Gill 412, 424 (1843), and Watkins, Maryland Mort-
gages for Future Advances, 8upra, n. 28 at pp. 112-13.
- 13 Md. 494 (1859).
845 Md. 396 (1876).
See n. 1, supra.
81 See ns. 1 and 5, supra.
37 What is notice might be determinative. For example, there are cases
which imply that a statement in the mortgage (or deed of trust) referring
to notes outstanding is notice that such notes exist and they should be
requested by the person dealing with the record holder of the mortgage.
Williams v. Jackson, 107 U. S. 478 (1882), and see also n. 1, supra. Quaere:
Is reference to the mortgage (or deed of trust) in the note notice, at least
at the time of the note's transfer, to check the mortgage of record?
8 In Bank v. Lanahan, supra, n. 34, the court expressed concern over the
fact that if It held the deed of trust within the purview of the mortgage
statute and the sale in the wrong county thus an invalid one, it would
destroy public faith and confidence in such sale. Similar reasoning should
lead the court to hold a deed of trust within the coverage of Art. 66, Sec. 24,
Bank v. Lanahan, supra, 410.
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If the Court should have this precise question before it,
it might, following the dicta of Royal Insurance Company
v. Drury"9 and the reasoning of Kinsey v. Drury4 ° and the
other cases which have been previously analyzed herein,
read deeds of trust out of the statute and favor the owner
of the note (or debt), construing the old Maryland cases
which involved ordinary mortgages as applying also to
deeds of trust.4' However, a better result would be obtained
either by (a) ignoring, overruling, or explaining and dis-
tinguishing the language of Royal Insurance Company v.
Drury, and deciding that although prior to the enactment
of Art. 66, Sec. 24, the old Maryland rule applied to mort-
gages, it never applied to deeds of trust; or by (b) deciding
that although the early Maryland rule did apply to deeds
of trust as well as mortgages, Art. 66, Sec. 24, likewise
applies to both types of instruments. It could be pointed
out that Royal Insurance Company v. Drury4 was not deal-
ing with conflicting rights of bona fide purchasers or the
effects of recording statutes, and that the correct result
is reached by the United States Supreme Court in Williams
v. Jackson43 on appeal from a District of Columbia appellate
court. The Supreme Court held that the one relying on the
record should prevail by reasoning simply that any other
result ". . . would be inconsistent with the purpose of the
registry laws, with the settled principles of equity, and
with the convenient transaction of business".
In order to follow this latter approach in Maryland it
would probably not only be necessary to distinguish the
aforementioned Maryland cases which differentiated deeds
of trust from mortgages in construing the various statutes
hereinabove described, but also would be necessary to
supply other reasoning and authority in support of the
proposition that a deed of trust can be a "mortgage or deed
in the nature of a mortgage". In addition to the fore-
going language used in Wilson v. Russell,44 and Charles v.
Clagett,"5 the following facts and cases might help support
such a proposition.
The pertinent language of Art. 66, Sec. 25, is almost the
same as Art. 66, Sec. 24, and reads:
Supra, circa, n. 6.
Supra, circa, n. 8.
"See n. 1, supra.
2Supra, circa, n. 6.
" Supra, n. 37.
"Supra, ns. 14, 20.
,5 Supra, circa, ns. 9-11a.
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"Whenever any real estate or leasehold interest
therein is encumbered by a mortgage, deed or other in-
strument in the nature of a mortgage, except when it
is otherwise agreed by the terms thereof, no annual
crops pitched or cultivated by any debtor therein or
those claiming under him shall pass with the said real
estate or leasehold interest at any sale under or by vir-
tue of said mortgage, deed or other instrument, but
such crops shall be and remain the property of the said
debtor, or those claiming under him, subject, however,
to the lien mentioned in the next section."
To hold that a trust deed is not within the reach of this
statute would allow its purpose to be defeated by mere
form. Furthermore, thereafter, the legislature passed "an
act providing for crop lien agreements, and providing for
the effect and recordation thereof", which reads:
"... and provided further that in the event of a sale,
under a mortgage or deed of trust executed and re-
corded after April 4, 1933, of the land upon which any
such crop has been so seeded and/or may be growing
and before said crop has been gathered or harvested,
such sale shall be made subject to the said crop lien,
and the rights of the lienee shall be protected in the
same manner and to the same extent as the rights of
the debtor would be protected under analogous circum-
stances under the provisions of Sections 25, 26 and 27
of Article 66 of the Annotated Code of Maryland."46
Fouke v. Fleming,47 referred to the deed of trust there as
a "quasi mortgage" to save it from the invalidity which
would have attached to a finding that it was a deed of trust
to pay creditors generally.
In Witt v. Zions," the Court treats deeds of trust as
mortgages and substitutes "mortgagee" for "cestui que
trust", saying:
"This case is an appeal by the appellants from the
order of the chancellor overruling exceptions filed by
them and finally ratifying and confirming a foreclosure
sale. The appellees are trustees named in a deed of
trust dated the 6th day of June, 1946, executed by the
appellants to them. This deed of trust is a mortgage
"Md. Laws (1933), Ch. 185, now Md. Code (1951), Art. 53, Sec. 26. Em-
phasis supplied.
17 13 Md. 392, 406 (1959).
70 A. 2d 594, 595, 596 (Md., 1949).
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andcontains a power in the trustees to sell the property
in the event that default is made in its terms and con-
ditions by the grantors. Default occurred and the trus-
tees instituted the foreclosure proceeding in this case
on December 30, 1948.
The exceptions to the ratification of the sale do not
charge fraud in the obtention of the mortgage."
Also Orrick v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,49 refers to the deed
of trust there involved as a "mortgage". In Manor Coal Co.
v. Beckman,50 the following appears in the syllabus:
"Where a deed of trust to secure bonds empowered
the trustee, upon default, to sell the property on the
request of the majority of the bondholders, but the
majority of the bonds had passed into the control of the
owner of the equity of redemption, and the trustee re-
fused to act at the request of the minority bondholders,
after the default, held that equity would decree a sale
of the property at the request of such minority bond-
holders."
The Court said:
"The conveyance therefore, though called a deed,
is in substance and purpose a mortgage, although it
differs from the conventional mortgage in that the
property pledged as security for money loaned is con-
veyed to a third person charged with the duty of
enforcing the lien instead of to the lender directly.
That statement of the purpose and meaning of the deed
agrees with the general rule by which the character
of such instruments is determined, and which is thus
stated in Jones on Mortgages, Par. 62: 'A deed of trust
to secure a debt is in legal effect a mortgage. It is a
conveyance made to a person other than the creditor,
conditioned to be void if the debt be paid at a certain
time, but if not paid that the grantee may sell the land
and apply the proceeds to the extinguishment of the
debt, paying over the surplus to the grantor. It is in
legal effect a mortgage with a power of sale, but the
addition of the power of sale does not change the chac-
acter of the instrument any more than it does when
contained in a mortgage. Such a deed has all the essen-
tial elements of a mortgage; it is a conveyance of land
as security for a debt. It passes the legal title just as a
' 113 Md. 239, 248, 77 A. 599 (1910).
151 Md. 102, 115, 133 A. 893 (1926).
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mortgage does, except in those states where the natural
effect of a conveyance is controlled by statute; and in
states where a mortgage is considered merely as a
security, and not a conveyance, a trust deed is apt to be
regarded in this respect just like a mortgage. Both
instruments convey a defeasible title only; the mort-
gagee's or trustee's title in fee being in the nature of a
base or determinable fee; and the right to redeem is
the same in one case as it is in the other.' 19 R. C. L.
270. Its primary and essential purpose was to secure
the payment of a debt, and the power of sale contained
in it is collateral to, and in aid of that purpose, and is,
generally speaking, a cumulative and not an exclusive
remedy. And while ordinarily the payment of the debt
secured by the mortgage must be enforced through an
execution of the power by the trustee, yet, where the
trustee refuses to act, or where his conduct threatens
to impair the security pledged by the deed, the lien
may be enforced in a court of equity under its general
chancery jurisdiction. Jones on Mortgages, Pars. 1733,
1443, 1774."
In a similar case in 1936, the Court in Northrop v.
Beale,"' said:
"The instrument, though in form a deed of trust,
was in effect a mortgage (Manor Coal Co. v. Beckman,
151 Md. 102, 115, 133 A. 893), containing the covenants
usually found in a technical mortgage (Code, Art. 66),
with respect to the payment of the principal debt, in-
terest, taxes, and public liens, with the right to fore-
close, however, if 'default be made in the payment of
any of said promissory notes... or any installment of
interest ... or any proper cost or expense in or about
the same'."
Any legal research in the field is further confounded
by the fact that certain publishing companies headnote,
cite, etc., cases and rulings dealing with deeds of trust under
"Mortgages". 2
Outside of Maryland we find language like the fol-
lowing:
- 170 Md. 439, 441, 184 A. 900 (1936).5 2For example see Davis v. Casey, 103 F. 2d 529 (C. A. D. C., 1939).
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"If the transaction, though in form a trust, contains
a defeasance clause, it will be construed to be in fact
a mortgage." 3
".... while a mortgage is not necessarily perhaps a
deed of trust, a deed of trust to secure the loan of money
is necessarily a mortgage.''1
A deed of trust in North Carolina is:
"... in the nature of a mortgage, and both are
placed together in the provisions of our registry laws,
and in many respects the same principles of law are
applicable to both kinds of such conveyances.' ' 5
Thus we find many authorities both in and outside of
Maryland, holding that a deed of trust given for security
and subject to a defeasance clause on payment of the debt,
and a mortgage, are essentially the same.56
In conclusion, it seems to be obvious that if the issue of
whether Art. 66, Sec. 24, applies to deeds of trust is ever
presented to the Court of Appeals, that substantial argu-
ments may be made on either side thereof. Unfortunately,
however, it is not so obvious what the decision of that Court
might be. The legislature could preclude the need for such
litigation, and remove substantial uncertainty, by explicitly
including deeds of trust, as herein suggested, within the
coverage of Art. 66, Sec. 24.
5Turner v. Watkins, 31 Ark. 429 (1876).
5W. A. H. Church, Inc. v. Holmes, 46 F. 2d 608, 610 (C. A. D. C., 1931).
Means v. Montgomery, 23 F. 421, 424 (C. C. W. D. N. C., 1884).
"See also: 19 R. C. L. Mortgages, Sec. 40, p. 269; JONES ON MORTUAGES
(8th Ed., 1928), Sec. 77; 59 C. J. S., Mortgages, Secs. 5, 6 and 7, pp. 31-2;
W ords and Phrases, Vol. 11, p. 473; Chicago Union Bank v. Kansas City
Bank, 136 U. S. 223 (1890) ; Cuzzola v. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 117
W. Va. 169, 184 S. E. 793, 794 (1936) ; JONES, supra, Sec. 2290; Sacramento
Bank v. Alcorn, 121 Cal. 379, 53 P. 813 (1898) ; BOGERT, TRusTS & TRus
(1951), Vol. 1, pp. 225-229.
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